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Make no mistake: It is impossible to interpret Kant’s account of duties of 
love in §§23 -26  of the Tugendlehre in just twenty pages or so. I will not 
even try to provide such an interpretation. I will provide, however, a par­
tial interpretation that shall demonstrate why it is impossible to interpret 
Kant’s theory in only a few pages. At the same time, I will sketch a re­
search program to show what kind of work needs to be done.
A preliminary though superficial understanding of the overall struc­
ture will be necessary; thus I begin with a very brief overview (1.); I will 
then analyse §23 in detail (2.); I conclude with a sketch of a research pro­
gram concerning some other sections (3.).
Anyone familiar with reading texts in the original language that they 
are written in knows that one cannot do serious research on a text without 
a very solid knowledge of its language; this should go without saying 
(though, I am afraid, this commonplace has lost its wide acceptance, 
mostly because of the analytic’ approach to the history of philosphy). 
Even if there were a translation of Kant’s Tugendlehre that were as 
good as its gets it would still be unable to bring across all the nuances 
and connotations, not to mention that some words simply cannot be 
translated (say, "accessorised) and that others have, for grammatical rea­
sons, possible references that cannot be brought across. Again, all that’s 
trivially true. In reality, of course, translations are far from being perfect. 
That they are not, indeed, I will demonstrate in passing by reference to 
Mary Gregor’s translation of the Tugendlehre1. This is not to say that 
translations are not useful in certain contexts, e. g. for introductory classes 
on Kant (as a matter of fact, a new translation of the Tugendlehre would 
be very worthwhile); but it is to say that serious research can only be done 
using the original text, and with an excellent facility in the language in 
which it was written.
1 In: Kant (1797) [1999].
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1. The Structure o f § § 2 3 -3 6  and Two Central Concepts—
an Overview
The Structure of §§23-36
§§23-36  constitute the first section (Abschnitt) (“On the Duty of Love 
to Other Human Beings” (TL 6:448.7)) of chapter I (“On Duties to 
Others Merely as Human Beings” (TL 6:448.5)) of part II (“Duties of 
Virtue to Others” (TL 6:448.3)) of the “Doctrine of the Elements of 
Ethics” (TL 6:448.1) §§23-36  can quite clearly be divided into four 
parts:
1. In §23, Kant begins with a “division” (TL 6:448.8) into the duties of 
love and respect. He briefly introduces duties of love as wide (merito­
rious) duties and duties of respect as narrow (owed). For the most part 
(as I will show), he discusses how these duties are connected accesso- 
rily.2 In §§24 and 25, both kinds of duties are further elaborated upon 
in quite a general manner.3
2. §§26-28  deal with “the duty of love in particular” (TL 6:450.14), 
and although these sections already focus on duty (or duties) of 
love they do so by discussing these duties still quite generally. §26 
once more puts emphasis on the practical character of love for 
human beings and introduces some concepts relevant to this practical 
concept of philanthropy (friend of humanity, enemy of humanity, 
selfishness, misanthropy). §§27—28 discuss problems that arise 
from the maxim of love of ones neighbor: first, the problem that 
this love must also somehow be directed towards oneself (§27); sec­
2 Let me make the preliminary remark that ‘accessoric’ and ‘accessoric connection 
might not be acceptable expressions in English. As we will see, Kant says that du­
ties o f love are “accessorisch gekniipft” (TL 6:448.22) with duties o f respect, and 
vice versa; note that accessorisch’ is an adverb here, and this I translate as ‘con­
nected accessorily.’ The German expression (“accessorisch gekniipft” (TL 
6:448.22)) is translated by Gregor as “joined to it as accessory.” I will explain 
what Kant means by this; in any event, i f  those expressions are not standard Eng­
lish, take them as a neologism (the term ‘accessoric’ is derived from the Latin ''ac­
cederé).
3 On the distinction between duties of love and duties o f respect in §25, cf. 
Sensen’s contribution to this volume as well as Bacin, forthcoming. -  It is, by 
the way, remarkable that Kant treats duties o f love first and only then duties 
o f respect, but it is not obvious why that is so; thanks to Stefano Bacin who 
pointed this out to me.
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ond, the problem that despite the universality of the required love of 
human beings certain degrees of obligation must be allowed, partly 
because one human being can be closer to oneself than another (§28).
3. In what follows, Kant presents the “division of duties of love” (TL 
6:452.10) and their treatment: beneficence (§§29-31), gratitude 
(§§32-33), and sympathetic feeling (Teilnehmung) (§§34-35).4
4. Section I concludes with §36 on several vices stemming from hatred 
for human beings (envy, ingratitude, malice).
Two Central Concepts in §§23 -36 : Love and Benevolence
Kants use of the concept ‘love is extraordinarily complex—in Kants phi­
losophy, one has to distinguish four different contexts or basic meanings 
of love and twelve or so aspects or connotations.5 With regard to §§23 - 
36 the following distinctions are crucial: The most important concept in 
this context is, of course, ‘duty of love (Liebespflicht); as a matter of fact, 
it is only in the heading of section I of the Tugendlehre that this concept is 
used in a systematic manner for the very first time.6 Of duties of love, 
though not only of them,7 Kant claims that they are “usually called duties
4 Note that the discussion of the duty o f beneficence concludes with casuistical 
questions (cf. TL 6:454) as does the discussion o f sympathetic feeling (teilneh­
m ende Empfindung) (cf. TL 6:458); the treatment o f gratitude, however, has 
no casuistical questions.
5 Cf. Schönecker, 2010.
6 Kant mentions “duties [...] o f love for one’s neighbor” (TL 6 :4 1 0 .1 6 f.) in the 
“Introduction;” only in passing, Kant uses “duties o f love” (TL 6:432.10) in 
the chapter on avarice; see also TL 6 :448: “On the Duty o f Love to Other 
Human Beings.” Both in TL 6:450.1 (“duty of love”) as well as in TL 
6:450.3 (“duty of love”) Kant uses the singular. -  All in all, Kant makes a rather 
sparse use of the term ‘duty o f love’ in his writings; note, however, that the con­
cept shows up in the Grundlegung (cf. GMS 4:430, note). In Erläuterungen Kants 
zu A.G. Baumgartens Initia philosophiae practicae prim ae (Acadamy Edition, 
vol. 19) the concept o f ‘Liebespflicht’ appears several times. In Kant’s Physischer 
Geographie one finds an interessting example: “Dagegen wird es in Lappland 
für eine ausgezeichnete Liebespflicht gehalten, wenn der Sohn seinen auf der 
Jagd verwundeten Vater mit einer Sehne vom Rennthiere tödtet, daher sie der­
selbe auch allezeit seinem geliebtesten Sohne anvertraut” (PG 9 :16 4 .2 0 -2 3).
7 According to this passage (cf. section XVIII o f the “Einleitung” (TL 6:410)), 
Kant distinguishes between “duties o f self-love and of love for one’s neighbor” 
(TL 6 :410 .16  f) , such that the latter would also include duties of respect (at 
least as far as the content o f the duties is concerned, their ‘material’).
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[...] of love for one’s neighbor” (TL 6:410.16f.). Accordingly, in §25 
Kant speaks again of the “duty of love for one’s neighbor” (TL 
6:450.3), and in §36 he mentions “love for our neighbor, which is in­
cumbent on us as a duty” (TL 6:460.11); however, Kant emphasizes, 
this expression (‘love for one’s neighbor,’ (Nächstenliebe)) is an expression 
“used inappropriately [in uneigentlicher Bedeutung], since there can be 
no direct duty to love, but instead to do that by which a human being 
[der Mensch] makes himself and other human beings [andere] his end” 
(TL 6:410.17—20, trans. D.S.).8 Thus, the love which duties of love 
are about, is taken to be “the maxim of benevolence (practical love)” 
(TL 6:449.20 f., italics D.S., emphasis in the original erased); this 
love, which in the context of duties Kant understands as “practical” 
(TL 6:450.16), he also calls “love of human beings [Menschenliebe] (phi­
lanthropy)” (TL 6:450.16) or “practical love of human beings” (TL 
6:450.31). In §§25—26, this practical love of human beings is twice 
and clearly distinguished from “love that is delight [Liebe des Wohlgefal­
lens]” (TL 6:449.18, 450.17). It is thus distinguished from the “love that 
is delight (amor complacentiae)” (TL 6:402.22), which in section XII of 
the “Introduction” is identified as that very love of human beings 
which is one of the four “natural predispositions of the mind [natürliche 
Gemüthsanlagen]” (TL 6:399.11) that enable human beings to be affect­
ed by the moral law and concepts of duty in the first place.9 Also, Kant 
discusses love in the context of friendship (§26 and §47).
It is obvious that next to the concept of love the concept of benevo­
lence (Wohlwollen) plays a crucial role in Kant’s theory of duties of love. 
Remarkably, love of human beings as a duty (generally speaking) is intro­
duced as “the maxim of benevolence” (TL 6:449.20 f.) and “the law mak­
ing benevolence a duty [Pflichtgesetz des Wohlwollens]” (TL 6:451.8 f ,  
italics D.S.) although only one of the three basic kinds of duties of 
love is “beneficence” (TL 6:452.14) (§29 ff.). Maybe this suggests that 
the three basic duties of love (beneficence, gratitude, sympathetic feeling) 
are not on the same level; maybe Kant understands beneficence as the 
grounding duty upon which the others are somehow based (but that is
8 Gregor translates: “[...] by which one makes oneself and others one’s end” (TL 
6 :410 .19£ , italics D.S.).
9 “[A\mor complacentiae” (TL 6:402.22) is thus opposed both to “benevolence 
{amor benevolentiae)" (TL 6:401.27) and to “love o f human beings (as an apti­
tude of the inclination to beneficence in general)” (TL 6:402.20 £, trans. D.S.). 
For a detailed interpretation o f these moral predispositions see Schönecker, 
2010 ; see also in this volume Goy.
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a topic for another paper). In any event, the concepts of benevolence and 
beneficence are not easy to grasp. For there is, first, active benevolence 
(tätiges Wohlwollen) (cf. e. g. TL 6:401.27, 452.4); there is, second, be­
nevolence in wishes (Wohlwollen des Wunsches) (cf. TL 6:452.1, 
452.23) which is not a duty; there is, thirdly, mere heartfelt benevolence 
0bloß herzliches Wohlwollen) (cf. TL 6:455.1—22) which is a duty; and 
possibly there is, fourth, benevolence in the general love for all human 
beings (Wohlwollen in der allgemeinen Menschenliebe) (cf. TL 6:451.21) 
which might be identical with benevolence in wishes.
2. A kommentarische Interpretation o f §23
The Division of Duties at the Beginning of §23
The “chief division” (TL 6:448.10) refers to the duties to others merely as 
human beings mentioned in the title of chapter I. This chief division of 
duties to others is the division of such duties to others by which others (i) 
are put under obligation towards oneself and (ii) those duties by which 
others are not obligated. The latter Kant calls “ow ed” (TL 6:448.14), 
the former “meritorious” (TL 6:448.13). Of course, this meritoriousness 
must not be understood as supererogatoriness, but in terms of wide or 
perfect duties; thus, in §25 Kant remarks that duties of love are “w ide” 
(TL 6:450.2) whereas duties of “free respect toward others” (TL 
6:449.31) are “narrow” (TL 6:450.1).10 Roughly, meritorious duties “re­
sult in obligation on the part of others” (TL 6:448.12) because one is not 
obliged to perform a (this very) specific action that would be considered a 
wide duty (though of course a wide duty remains a dutf) and so, if I do it, 
the recipient of my action is indebted to me for that specific action. Nar­
row duties, on the contrary, I must perform under all circumstances any­
way. — I will not comment on this further; to the present day, there is no 
detailed and satisfying account of the basic distinction between wide and 
narrow duties on the one hand and duties of virtue and duties of right on 
the other.
10 See, for instance, the meaning o f “wide [weit]” in the Grundlegung (GMS 
4 :424.11, 430.10).
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What Is §23 About?
Right after the “chief division” (TL 6:448.10), Kant continues: “Love and 
respect are the feelings that accompany [begleiten] the carrying out of 
these duties” (TL 6:448.14 f). ‘These duties’ are the ‘meritorious’ and 
‘owed’ duties mentioned before. In the first few lines, Kant does not 
use the terms ‘duties of love’ or ‘duties of respect,’ but of course, they 
are what is talked about. Thus, it is quite natural to think that love ac­
companies the carrying out of the duty of love, whereas respect accom­
panies the carrying out of the duty of respect; however, this is not the 
case.11 That indeed a duty of love is not necessarily accompanied by a feel­
ing of love becomes evident in Kant’s analysis of the duty of gratitude. 
There, Kant writes very clearly that it is not the feeling of love that is con­
nected with the duty of gratitude (which is a duty of love), but the feeling 
of “respect” (TL 6:454.33, 458.13): “Gratitude consists in honoring a 
person because of a benefit he has rendered us. The fee lin g  connected 
with this judgment is respect for the benefactor (who puts one under ob­
ligation), whereas the benefactor is viewed as only in relation of love to­
ward the recipient” (TL 6:454.31—455.1, italics D.S., emphasis in the 
original erased).12 Thus a duty of love can be accompanied by a feeling 
of respect (and vice versa, one would think). But why then does Kant 
call wide duties duties of love and narrow duties duties of respect? 
There is, I believe, no strict philosophical justification; probably it simply 
is a reference to the Christian tradition. I will return to this question in 
due course.13
Love and respect, says Kant, are the feelings that accompany the car­
rying out of the duties of love and respect. As demonstrated, this can easi­
ly be misunderstood. In what follows, Kant is even more confusing:
11 Cf. Gregor, 1963, p. 182: “Kant mentions that the duties are called duties o f love 
and respect because o f the feelings which accompany our observance of them” -  
but where does Kant ‘mention’ this? Nowhere, really. Forkl, 2001, p. 206, claims 
that love always accompanies the carrying out o f duties o f love and respect the 
carrying out o f duties o f respect: “Die Liebe begleitet stets die Ausübung der ver­
dienstlichen Pflichten, die Achtung stets die Ausübung der schuldigen Pflichten.”
12 See also TL 6 :458.12: “Gratitude is not, strictly speaking, love [Gegenliebe] to­
ward a benefactor on the part o f someone he has put under obligation, but rather 
respect for him.” Still gratitude is a duty o f love.
13 Beck even claims that Kant regards practical love “as equivalent to the love com- 
maneded by Christianity” (Beck 31963, p. 233).
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“They [Sie] can be considered separately (each by itself) and can also exist 
in this way [i.e. separately, D.S.]” (TL 6:448.15 f ,  trans. D.S.).
One very tempting interpretation is to take the demonstrative pro­
noun ‘they’ to refer to those feelings of love and respect, so that Kants 
claim would be that the feeling of love and the feeling of respect “can 
be considered separately (each by itself) and can also exist separately” 
(TL 6:448.15 f). Yet again, this is not the case. My central claim is 
this: Beginning with that sentence (‘They can be considered separately 
. . . ’), the whole section (§23) is on the accessoric connection o f  duties, and 
not about the feelings o f  love and respect. To see this, we have to take a clos­
er look. First, the German original:
L ieb e  und A c h tu n g  sind die Gefühle, welche die Ausübung dieser Pflich­
ten begleiten. Sie können abgesondert (jede für sich allein) erwogen werden 
und auch so bestehen (L iebe des Nächsten, ob dieser gleich wenig A c h ­
tu n g  verdienen möchte; imgleichen nothwendige Achtung für jeden Men­
schen, unerachtet er kaum der Liebe werth zu sein beurtheilt würde). Sie 
sind aber im Grunde dem Gesetze nach jederzeit mit einander in einer 
Pflicht zusammen verbunden; nur so, daß bald die eine Pflicht, bald die an­
dere das Prinzip im Subject ausmacht, an welche die andere accessorisch ge­
knüpft ist. -  So werden wir gegen einen Armen wohlthätig zu sein uns für 
verpflichtet erkennen; aber weil diese Gunst doch auch Abhängigkeit seines 
Wohls von meiner Großmut enthält, die doch den Anderen erniedrigt, so ist 
es Pflicht, dem Empfänger durch ein Betragen, welches diese Wohltätigkeit 
entweder als bloße Schuldigkeit oder geringen Liebesdienst vorstellt, die De- 
müthigung zu ersparen und ihm seine Achtung für sich selbst zu erhalten 
(TL 6 :4 4 8 .1 4 -4 4 9 .2 ,  bold D.S.).
Here’s Gregors translation:
Love and respect are the feelings that accompany the carrying out o f these du­
ties. They [Sie] can be considered separately (each by itself) and can also 
exist separately (one can lov e  one’s neighbor though he might deserve but lit­
tle respect, and can show him the respect necessary for every human being 
regardless o f the fact that he would hardly be judged worthy o f love). But 
they [Sie] are basically always united by the law into one duty, only in 
such a way that now one duty and now the other is the subject’s principle, 
with the other joined to it as accessory. — So we shall acknowledge that we are 
under obligation to help someone poor; but since the favor we do implies 
that his well-being depends on our generosity, and this humbles him, it is 
our duty to behave as i f  our help is either merely what is due him [sic!] 
or but a slight service o f love, and to spare him humiliation and maintain 
his respect for himself (TL 6 :4 4 8 .1 4 —449.2 , bold D.S.).
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Here’s my translation:14
Love and respect are the feelings that accompany the carrying out o f these 
duties. They [Sie] can be considered separately (each by itself) and can 
also exist in this way [i.e. separately, D.S.] (love o f  one’s neighbor though 
he might deserve but litde respect; likewise necessary respect for every 
human being regardless o f  the fact that he would be judged hardly worthy 
o f love). But they [Sie] are really always united with each other according 
to the law in a single duty, yet only in such a way that now one duty, 
now the other constitutes the principle in the subject, such that one duty 
is joined to the other accessorily. — So we shall recognize ourselves as 
being obligated to be beneficent to someone poor; but because this favour 
also implies the dependence o f his well-being on m y generosity, which 
does humble the other, it is a duty to spare the recipient humiliation and 
to maintain for him his respect for himself, by means o f  a conduct that pres­
ents this beneficence either as something simply due to him or as a small 
service o f love (TL 6 :4 4 8 .1 4 —449.2 , trans. and bold D.S.).
The crucial question simply is this: What do the two demonstrative pro­
nouns “[t]hey [Sie]” (TL 6:448.15, 448.19) refer to? Depending on the 
answer, the meaning of the text changes completely (a very rare phenom­
enon when it comes to philosophical texts). This is not only a matter of 
how to interpret this passage; a correct understanding of this passage 
might have far reaching consequences for the interpretation of other pas­
sages as well (I will give an example in support of this claim later). It is a 
widespread misunderstanding to believe that close reading will at best dis­
close details that are, however, irrelevant to the philosophical argument or 
thesis. Arguments are not simply ‘there;’ they must be reconstructed by a 
detailed, interpretative effort, and numerous examples can be given that 
demonstrate how paying attention to (so-called) details can entirely
14 Let me point out the main differences: Gregor translates “L iebe des Nächsten” 
(TL 6 :448.16  f.) with “one can love one’s neighbor” instead o f “love of one’s 
neighbor” (more on this below); she misplaces “hardly” (TL 6:448.18), making 
it an adverb which it is not; she leaves “mit einander [with each other]” (TL 
6:448.20, trans. D.S.) untranslated; “accessorisch” (TL 6:448.22) is an adverb 
to “geknüpft” (TL 6:448.22); she translates “to help someone poor” where it 
says “gegen einen Armen wohltätig zu sein [to be beneficent to someone poor] ” 
(TL 6:448.23, trans. and italics D.S.); and the latter part o f the last sentence con­
tains some more minor flaws. Let me point out that I have the greatest respect for 
her translation o f Kant’s Metaphysik der Sitten ; this is hard and tedious work. I 
hope that one can see, however, that serious research on Kant’s text cannot be 
done without the ability to read German. — Many thanks to Richard Capobianco 
for helping with my translation and many thanks as well to Marcia Baron for 
checking the whole paper.
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change our understanding of an argument.15 In any event, even if there 
were no far reaching consequences with regard to §23, a correct interpre­
tation is still at order.
Just looking at the first “They” (TL 6:448.15) (for short: They^, 
there will be a strong tendency to think that it refers to “[l]ove and re­
spect” (TL 6:448.14) (and thus indirectly to the “feelings” (TL 
6:448.14)).16 This yields the following proposition:
(FI) The feelings of love and respect “can be considered separately (each by 
itself) and can also exist separately” (TL 6:448.15 f.).
Once this is assumed, the second “They” (TL 6:448.19) (for short: 
They2) must also refer to those feelings because it clearly relates to the 
first noun which is They!. Hence we get:
(F2) The feelings of love and respect “are really always united with each 
other according to the law in a single duty, yet only in such a way 
that now one duty, now the other constitutes the principle in the sub­
ject, such that one duty is joined to the other accessorily” (TL 
6:448.19-22, trans. D.S.).
This is the p rim a fa cie  way of reading those sentences. This reading can­
not possibly be correct, though. In order to see this, it is important to 
read the whole section with the end of the section in mind. At the con­
clusion of this section, there is an example which certainly is not about 
the feelings of love and respect but about the accessoric connection of 
one duty to another.17 I will go into the details later, but the basic idea 
seems simple: One duty, which in the example is the duty of love to 
help as a specified duty of beneficence, entails—if that is not too strong 
a term (read: brings along)—another duty (which in the example is the 
narrow duty of not humiliating the recipient of ones help). Having to 
carry out a duty of love involves having to carry out a duty of respect; 
if I am to help a poor man, doing so brings along the duty not to humil­
iate that poor man (the recipient of my beneficence).18 In any event, the
15 For a recent example, cf. Schönecker, 2010b.
16 For grammatical reasons (because o f “(Jede für sich allein)” (TL 6:448.16, italics 
D.S.)), the reference can, i f  at all, only be to “[l]ove and respect” (TL 6:448.14, 
emphasis in the original erased, D.S.); I will get back to this later. In any event, 
love and respect are the feelings talked about.
17 Again, in German: “accessorisch geknüpft” (TL 6:448.22).
18 The same idea one can find in §31 of the Tugendlehre. Note, however, that in 
§31 Kant refers explicitly to “him [er]” (TL 6:453.22), which goes back to
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“So” (TL 6:448.22) (both in German and English) clearly expresses that 
we are provided with an example. Now if the example is about this ac- 
cessoric connection of one duty with another (“such that one duty is 
joined to the other accessorily” (TL 6:448.21 f., trans. and italics 
D.S.)), and if the example (“So” (TL 6:448.22)) exemplifies a thesis in 
the preceding sentence, then this sentence must be about the accessoric 
connection of one duty with another. Referring They2 to duties rather 
than to feelings of love and respect, the meaning of that sentence then is:
(D2) Duties of love and duties of respect “are really always united with each 
other according to the law in a single duty, yet only in such a way that 
now one duty, now the other constitutes the principle in the subject, 
such that one duty is joined to the other accessorily” (TL 6:448.19 — 
22, trans. D.S.).
If, however, They2 does refer to duties of love and respect, and not to the 
feelings of love and respect, then They! also must refer to these duties 
(again, because They2 picks up the noun They!). Thus we get:
(Dl) Duties of love and respect “can be considered separately (each by it­
self) and can also exist separately” (TL 6:448.15 fi).
But then the whole passage beginning with They! is about duties of love 
and respect, not about the feelings of love and respect that accompany 
these duties, and thus the prima fa cie  interpretation must be given up.
Marcia Baron shares the prima fa cie  reading and yet cannot help but 
note: “It is hard to believe that Kant really means that as feelings love and 
respect are united by the law into one duty.’ So, although he says he is 
speaking of them as feelings at this point, I am not convinced that he 
is.”19 But Baron does believe that Kant ‘says’ so, and so do Forkl, 2001, 
p. 206 and Burggraf, 2005, p. 159. Koch, 2003, pp. 147fi, on the 
other hand, simply assumes that D2 is the correct interpretation, not 
F2; but he says next to nothing about it. Horn, 2008, p. 166 mentions 
§23 only in passing, without seeing the interpretative problem; the same 
is true for Anderson, 2008, p. 141, Malibabo, 2000, pp. 208 f£, Moors, 
2005, pp. 64 f., Rompp, 2006, p. 225, Steigleder, 2002, pp. 260 f., and 
Witschen, 2006, p. 628. Esser, 2004, pp. 371 £, discusses §24, but not 
§23 (in a similar fashion, but very brief cf. Mairhofer, 1975, p. 47 and 
Murphy, 1994, p. 83 £); Streich, 1924, pp. 36 f£, and Guyer, 2010, dis­
the beginning o f the section where Kant introduces someone who is “rich” (TL
6:453.17).
19 Baron, 2004, p. 395.
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cusses love in the Metaphysik der Sitten, but do not discuss §23. Gregor, 
1963, p. 182, footnote 4, has a somewhat mixed interpretation: “The 
feelings of love and respect for others can occur separately, but practical 
love and respect are always united in a duty of virtue to others;” but she 
just states this without any interpretation. As far as I can tell, there is to 
the present day no detailed analysis of §23 (not even by non-kommentari- 
sche standards), and very little on the other sections on duties of love as 
well. (I will not discuss the literature regarding the other sections.)
Let us now have a closer look at the text of §23. Not only do the 
grammatical reasons just provided speak for the claim that most of it is 
about duties, not about feelings; read this way, it also makes much 
more philosophical sense.
Duties of Love and Respect as Accessorily Connected
No doubt, the example (‘So we shall recognize ourselves . . . ’) is about du­
ties and their accessoric connection. Once this is recognized, it will come 
as no surprise that the preceding sentence (to which the example refers) is 
also clearly about duties and their accessoric connection. Let us look 
again: “[T]hey are really always united with each other according to 
the law in a single duty, yet only in such a way that now one duty, 
now the other constitutes the principle in the subject, such that one 
duty is joined to the other accessorily” (TL 6:448.19 — 22, trans. D.S.). 
On close reading, it is very hard to see how this can be read as a statement 
about feelings (in terms of F2). The latter part of this sentence is about 
duties (now one duty, now the other (duty),’ ‘such that one duty is joined 
to the other (duty) accessorily). The former part of the sentence could, 
just at its semantic surface, be read as referring to feelings in terms of 
F2, maybe saying that the feelings of love and respect are “really always 
united with each other according to the law in a single duty yet only in 
[...] a way’ (TL 6:448.19-21, trans. and italics D.S.) that sometimes 
the duty of love, sometimes the duty of respect “constitutes the principle 
in the subject” (TL 6:448.21 f., trans. D.S.). So on this reading the idea 
would be that because those duties are accessorily connected,’ the feelings 
that accompany these duties are also ‘united,’ to wit, united ‘in a single 
duty,’ that is, a single (one) duty inasmuch it connects two duties one 
of which is accessoric. -  But this reading is highly implausible. First of 
all, if the real theme of that sentence were the connection of feelings, 
then that theme would, quite confusingly, receive no treatment in the ex­
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ample; the example simply is not about such a connection of feelings but 
about the connection of duties (which the latter part of that sentence 
speaks very clearly about). Second, even if that charitable reading is as­
sumed, it remains opaque what exactly it would mean that the feelings 
of love and respect are “really always united with each other according 
to the law in a single duty” (TL 6:448.19 £, trans. and italics D.S.). 
Third, the new reading also fits much better with the rest of the sentence, 
because the claim then is that really {im Grunde) duties of love and of 
respect are ‘united with each other,’ ‘only in such way’ that one is joined 
to the other as accessory. Kant’s formulation that the duties are accesso- 
rily connected’ is a specification of the preceding formulation that they 
are united with each other’.
What then does Kant say about the accessoric connection expressed 
in D1 and D2? Let us try to look at the details of Kant’s theory of the 
accessoric connection of duties of love and respect; this will further 
strengthen our alternative (secunda facie) reading.20
(i) Kant: Duties of love and duties of respect “are really always united 
with each other according to the law in a single duty” (TL 6:448.19 f., 
trans. and italics D.S.). -  This is a strong claim: Every duty to benefi­
cence, gratitude and sympathy is always ijederzeit) connected accessorily 
with a duty of respect; whenever I (have to) carry out a duty of love, I 
(have to) carry out a duty of respect, and vice versa. But is this really 
true for all duties of love and respect, and is it true in both directions 
such that all duties of love are connected with duties of respect, and 
vice versa, one of them constituting “the principle in the subject” (TL 
6:448.21, trans. D.S.) ? As for the duty of beneficence, its accessoric con­
nection with the duty of respect seems to make sense right away. For if I 
carry out such a wide, meritorious duty, the recipient of my beneficence is 
put under obligation, and this humbles him and can be detrimental to his 
self-respect. Hence, I must follow the duty of respect not to humiliate 
him. However, what exactly is this duty of respect? If the duty of respect 
is a negative duty (avoid arrogance, defamation, ridicule),21 what exactly 
is then the connection with the duty of love? Kant says very little about 
this; as a matter of fact, all he says about the accessoric connection of du­
ties of love with duties of respect is in §23.22 How about this: When it
20 For further interpretations see Bacin, forthcoming.
21 Cf. § § 4 2-4 4 .
22 The term ‘accessorisch’ (as such) appears only once in Kant’s opus (to wit, in
§23).
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comes to beneficence, arrogance (entailing humiliation) must be avoided; 
as for gratitude, defamation is the lurking vice; and concerning sympathy 
(,teilnehmende Empfindung) all three vices must be actively avoided. One 
can easily see that this is far from obvious; as often with Kant, the exam­
ple works fine, but the general claim behind it is much less convincing. 
Even less striking is Kants thesis that duties of respect are accessorily con­
nected with duties of love—what could that possibly mean with regard to 
the specific duties of love and respect?
(ii) Kant: Duties of love and duties of respect “are really always unit­
ed with each other according to the law in a single duty” (TL 6:448.19 f., 
trans. and italics D.S.). -  What does ‘according to the law’ (dem Gesetze 
nach) mean? It can not mean that the accessoric connection between du­
ties is always the case; this is true, says Kant, but this aspect is already 
expressed by always.’ Rather, the idea must be that duties of love and re­
spect are founded on a general law, i. e. the moral law or the categorical 
imperative. This is a well known claim of Kant’s; what exactly it means, I 
cannot discuss here.
(iii) Kant: Duties of love and duties of respect “are really always unit­
ed with each other according to the law in a single duty” (TL 6:448.19 £, 
trans. and italics D.S.). -  This is just the claim that duties of love and 
duties of respect are connected, such that they build a conjunctive duty, 
and in that sense a ‘single’ (or ‘one’) duty. However, Kant is eager to stress 
in the latter part of D2 that they are one duty, but “only in such a way that 
now one duty, now the other constitutes the principle in the subject, such 
that one duty is joined to the other accessorily” (TL 6:448.21 £, trans. 
and italics D.S.). Recall that D2 in the original formulation says: “But 
they[2] [duties of love and respect, D.S.] are really always united with 
each other according to the law in a single duty” (TL 6:448.19 £, 
trans. and italics D.S.). The ‘but’ refers to D1 in opposition to which 
D2 is stated: “Theyh] [duties of love and respect, D.S.] can be consid­
ered separately (each by itself) and can also exist in this way [i.e. separate­
ly, D.S.]” (TL 6:448.15 £, trans. D.S.). So these duties are separate (ab- 
gesondert) duties, but on the other hand they are accessorily connected 
and in this respect a single’ duty. Note that the ‘but’ provides additional 
evidence that D1 is about duties, not about feelings; the general topic in 
these sentences is the separateness and connection of those duties.
(iv) Kant: In accessorily connected duties there is one duty that “con­
stitutes the principle in the subject” (TL 6:448.21 £, trans. and italics 
D.S.). -  Let us again look at the example: Note that it says: “we shall rec­
ognize ourselves as being obligated to be beneficent to someone poor
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[gegen einen Armen]” (TL 6:448.22 f., trans. and italics D.S.), not ‘to the 
poor.’ Thus, there is an actualized duty to beneficence, actualized’ in the 
sense that a wide duty must be fulfilled specifically given a specific situa­
tion. This duty is what I recognize (erkennen) and which moves me; con­
trary to this duty, the duty “to spare the recipient humiliation and to 
maintain for him his respect for himself” (TL 6:448.25—449.2, trans. 
D.S.) is a secondary duty which only applies because the wide duty to 
beneficence is actualized. If in a given case I do not recognize myself 
as obligated to be beneficent to this particular poor person, then I am 
not obligated ‘to spare that person humiliation and to maintain for 
him his respect for himself’ simply because I cannot behave in a way 
that presents my beneficence “either as something simply due to 
him or as a small service of love” (TL 6.448.26—449.1, trans. D.S.) 
(still I must not humiliate him in other ways, of course). Thus in the ex­
ample the duty of beneficence constitutes “the principle in the subject” 
(TL 6:448.21, trans. D.S.) inasmuch it is the primary duty that entails 
the secondary.23
(v) Kant: Duties of love and duties of respect are accessorily connect­
ed. -  This has been accounted for: The connection is accessoric because 
one duty (in the example the duty of respect not to humiliate) accedes, as 
it were, to another, (in the example: to the duty of love to be beneficent); 
the former would not apply without the latter.
(vi) Kant: Although duties of love and respect are accessorily connect­
ed, “[t]hey can be considered separately (each by itself) and can also exist 
separately” (TL 6:448.15 f., italics D.S.). — It is to be expected that 
Kant will put forward such a claim, if only for the reason that indeed 
he does treat duties of love and duties of respect separately in different 
chapters. There is a certain tension, though, between this claim and 
the central claim that duties of love and respect are accessorily connected. 
Once more, let us look at the example: Certainly, there is no difficulty to 
consider the duty of beneficence and the duty not to humiliate “separate­
ly” (TL 6:448.15), i.e. “each by itself [jede für sich allein]” (TL
23 In Der Streit d er Fakultäten there is a passage in wich Kants distinguishes between 
what belongs “zum Wesentlichen (principale)” (SF 7:64.9 f.) and “zum Beigesell­
ten (accessorium f (SF 7:64.10). — The term accessoric’ is often used in juridical 
contexts. In P ierer’s Universal-Lexikon, vol. 12, Altenburg, 1861, pp. 188—189, I 
find (online) the following note: “Jede Obligation ist ferner entweder eine selb­
ständige, für sich bestehende, od. accessorische, welche erst einer anderen O. hin­
zutritt, z. B. eine Bürgschaft.” In (German) jurisprudence, there is still a ‘Prinzip 
der Akzessorietät’; for this juridical context see RL 6:268.
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6:448.16).24 However, how shall the duty not to humiliate also exist like 
this,’ i. e. exist separately, if “exist [bestehen]” (TL 6:448.16) means 
something like apply,’ ‘to be in force’ or ‘to be valid’? There is, it 
seems, a dilemma: Either a duty of love (likewise, a duty of respect) 
“can [...] exist separately” (TL 6:448.15 £), in which case it is neither 
“accessori[c]” (TL 6:448.22) nor the “principle in the subject” (TL 
6:448.21, trans. D.S.); or it is part of such an accessoric connection of 
duties, in which case it can not “exist separately” (TL 6:448.15 f.).
(vii) Kant: They (duties of love and respect) can be considered sep­
arately (each by itself) and can also exist like this (“love of one’s neighbor 
though he might deserve but litde respect; likewise necessary respect for 
every human being regardless of the fact that he would be judged hardly 
worthy of love” (TL 6:448.16-19, trans. D.S., emphasis in the original 
erased)). -  I would now like to analyze what is said in parenthesis about 
love and respect. Again, it all depends on how one reads the ‘They’ (i. e. 
They^. If it refers to the feelings of love and respect, then what is said 
about love and respect in parenthesis is also about those feelings. Here, 
it is worthwhile to take a closer look at Gregor’s translation of the pas­
sage: “[...] (one can love one’s neighbor though he might deserve but lit­
tle respect, and can show him the respect necessary for every human being 
regardless of the fact that he would hardly be judged worthy of love)” (TL 
6:448.16-19). In German, there is no hint that“one can love one’s 
neighbor” (TL 6:448.16); it simply says “Liebe des Nächsten” (TL 
6:448.16) which should therefore be translated with ‘love of one’s neigh­
bor.’ (The term is no less strange in German than it is in English.) Gre­
gor’s translation strongly suggests that it is the feeling of love that one can 
bring up against someone who deserves not even respect (“one can love” 
(TL 6:448.16)), and “likewise” (TL 6:448.17 f.) the other way round. 
However, on the assumption that “They” (TL 6:448.15) at the beginning
24 I already pointed out that the grammatical form o f the parenthesis “(jede für sich 
allein)” (TL 6:448.16) only allows the reference to “Liebe and Achtung” (TL 
6:448.14), provided that one refers They! to the feelings o f love and respect at 
all. If the reference were “Gefühle” (TL 6:448.14), it would need to say ‘jeder 
für sich allein’; note, by the way, that this is a grammatical point that gets lost, 
and must get lost, in the translation. Still, the reference of “jede” to “love and 
respect” would be awkward, for then one must read (in German; again, that’s 
not translatable): ‘jede, sowohl die Liebe wie auch die Achtung, für sich allein 
. . . ’ If, however, one refers They! to the duties of love and respect and, accord­
ingly, “jede für sich allein” to these duties as well, the reference is easy and 
smooth.
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of that sentence refers to the duties rather than to the feelings of love and 
respect, there must be another interpretation of that sentence. A closer 
look reveals that this is not only possible, but obvious.25 First of all, 
note that ‘love of ones neighbor’ is an expression that in the context of 
§§23-36  Kant uses (as he does elsewhere)26 to refer to the duty of 
love of one’s neighbor. Just two sections later (in §2) Kant speaks of 
the “duty of love for one’s neighbor” (TL 6:450.3, italics D.S.); and 
again a bit later (in §§27 and 28) he twice mentions the Christian 
duty to love one’s neighbor (cf. TL 6:450.33, 451.29). There is no 
doubt that in the wider context of §§23 ff. Kant explicitly understands 
love as a normative concept, not as a feeling: “In this context [hier], how­
ever, love is not to be understood as feeling [...] It must rather be thought 
as the maxim of benevolence (practical love), which results in benefi­
cence” (TL 6:449.17—22, emphasis in the original erased, D.S.); and a 
few lines later: “Since the love of human beings (philanthropy) we are 
thinking of here is practical love [ .. . ]” (TL 6:450.16£). By the same 
token, there is a “duty of respect for one’s neighbor” (TL 6:450.5). Of 
course, in §23 love and respect are first introduced as feelings (‘Love 
and respect are the feelings that accompany the carrying out of these du­
ties’). But as we have seen, right after that Kant (with Theyj) moves on to 
love and respect as duties,27 so that ‘love of one’s neighbor’ in that paren­
thetical clause of §23 can and must indeed be understood as the ‘practical 
love’ (of beneficence) that is a duty. The same is true for the “respect [...] 
for every human being” (TL 6:448.18). Kant qualifies this respect as 
“necessary [nothwendige]” (TL 6:448.18),28 as something that ought to 
be and thus as a duty; feelings are not ‘necessary,’ and so if Kant referred 
to respect as a feeling he could not call it necessary. Secondly, it is impor­
tant to see that the sentence in parentheses is obviously meant as a com­
25 It is therefore potentially misleading that Bernd Ludwig edits that parenthesis as a 
separate sentence (Kant (1797) ['1990]); this is different in the Academy Edi­
tion.
26 See, for instance, KpV 5 :8 1 -8 6 .
27 Things would have been easier, i f  Kant had written ‘Diese (These) rather than 
“Sie [They]” (TL 6:448.15). In TL 6 :4 8 3 .2 6 -3 1  one finds another example 
of a sentence in which Kant uses “sie” (TL 6:483.31) where 'diese would have 
been appropriate (“sie” (TL 6:483.31) there refers to “Pflicht” (TL 6:483.30)).
28 The “necessary” (TL 6:448.18) really is an attribute to “respect” (TL 6:448.18), 
so the claim is that respect is necessary, but not that it is (as in Gregor’s transla­
tion) “necessary f o r  every human being” (TL 6:448.18, italics D.S.) (whatever 
that means).
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ment on the main clause which is about the separateness of the duties of 
love and respect; thus it further elaborates upon that separateness. Note, 
however, that love and respect are not entirely separated: One shall love 
ones neighbor though she “might deserve but little respect” (TL 
6:448.17); and one shall respect ones neighbor though she “would be 
judged hardly worthy of love” (TL 6:448.18 £, trans. D.S.). It is hard 
to see what Kants point is, but maybe it can be formulated as follows: 
The wide duty of love must be fulfilled even if someone seems not 
even worthy of the narrow duty of respect that we owe him; and we 
owe every human being respect regardless of how much (or rather little) 
actions of love it deserves. The sentence in parentheses remains somewhat 
enigmatic; but it does so on any reading of its context. It would be much 
easier to understand if Kant meant to say that one must love one’s neigh­
bor whether she’s worthy of love or not; and that one must respect one’s 
neighbor whether she’s worthy of respect or not.29
Finally, one more note on love and respect as the accompanying feel­
ings.30 31We have already seen that it is not Kant’s claim that the feeling of 
love accompanies duties of love and that the feeling of respect accompa­
nies duties of respect. But it is also not his claim that the only feelings that 
specifically’1 accompany these duties are love and respect. Once more it is 
important not to discuss duties of love just generally, but to specify these 
duties as Kant does himself (duties of beneficence, gratitude, sympathy):
(i) When it comes to beneficence, there is the “satisfaction [ Vergnügen] 
in the happiness (well-being) of others” (TL 6:452.27, italics D.S.). In 
section XII of the “Introduction” Kant mentions “love of [...] [human 
beings, D.S.] [Menschenliebe] (as an aptitude [Fertigkeit] of the inclina­
tion to beneficence in general)” (TL 6:402.20 f., ) that results from be­
neficence; in Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre Kant understands love of 
human beings as the “Freude über das physische und moralische Wohl- 
seyn eines Anderen” (VATL 23:407.34 f., italics D.S.).
(ii) As already mentioned, the duty of gratitude as a duty of love is 
not accompanied by the feeling of love but by the feeling of respect; an­
other term Kant avails himself of in this context is “honoring [Vereh-
29 See §27 where Kant says that practical love “is a duty of all human beings toward 
one another, whether or not one finds them worthy of love” (TL 6 :450 .3 1—33).
30 See, once more, TL 6 :454.32 f.: “The feeling connected  with this judgment [...]” 
(italics D.S.).
31 O f course, all kinds of context-relative and subject-relative emotions and feelings 
can be involved in a concrete carrying out o f a duty.
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rung ]” (TL 6:454.31), since gratitude (as “active ’ (TL 6:455.3) grati­
tude) is maybe defined as “honoring a person because of a benefit he 
has rendered us” (TL 6:454.31 f.).32 Next to this Kant also knows of an­
other form of gratitude which very clearly is something like a feeling, sc. 
“affective [affectionellen ] gratitude” (TL 6:455.3 f.).
(iii) The duty of sympathetic feeling is the one most clearly accom­
panied by specific feelings; these are the feelings of “{Sympathetic jo y  
and sadness [M itfreude und M it le id ]” (TL 6:456.20).
(iv) Last but not least, one has to ask whether what Kant means by 
“carrying out [Ausübung]” (TL 6:448.15) duties of love and respect is 
just a successful carrying out of these duties (such that one really is benef­
icent, grateful, and sympathetic) or a fa ilin g  of carrying out of these du­
ties. In the latter case, “envy, ingratitude, and malice” (TL 6:458.23 f.) 
(§36) need to be considered.
A Possible Consequence: Accessoric vs. Intimate Union of Love and
Respect
According to §23, the connection of the duties of love with the duties of 
respect is accessoric. Kant goes on to discuss the duties of respect (up to 
§36); part II (§§37-44), then, is about the duties of respect. Both these 
kinds of duties to others are duties to others merely as human beings; 
later, there is a very brief chapter (only one section, i. e. §45) on ethical 
duties of human beings toward one another with regard to their condi­
tion. But that’s not the end of part II of the doctrine of virtues to others; 
there is a “conclusion of the elements of ethics” (TL 6:469.13) which is 
about the “most intimate union of love with respect in friendship” (TL 
6:469.14 f.), laid out in §46—47.
These two sections are difficult and require an analysis no less de­
tailed (or kommentarisch33) then the one I tried for §23. I cannot do 
this here, but I would like to draw attention to the following point. To 
begin with, friendship in this context (moral friendship anyway, “as dis­
32 I say ‘maybe,’ because active gratitude— similar to practical philanthropy—might 
not be an actual feeling in any proper sense (actual “honoring (TL 6:454.31)), 
but just a maxim, whatever the feeling would be connected with it (or its effected 
action). Thus one could be gratitious without having the feeling of gratitude.
33 On the idea o f ‘kommentarische’ interpretations cf. Schonecker, 22004, and Dam- 
schen/Schonecker, 2012, pp. 2 0 3 —272.
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tinguished from aesthetic friendship” (TL 6:471.26, trans. D.S.)34) is un­
derstood as a “duty” (TL 6:469.23). Therefore, love and respect as the 
ingredients of friendship are not understood as feelings either; for in­
stance, pointing out ones friends faults to him or her is interpreted by 
Kant as a duty of friendship (which is a “duty of love” (TL 
6:470.23)). He also describes love as “attraction” (TL 6:470.5) and re­
spect as “repulsion” (TL 6:470.5), two concepts easily misunderstood 
as feelings too; but Kant explicitly says that “theprinciple of the former 
[i.e. of attraction resp. love, D.S.]35 commands approach, the [principle, 
D.S.] of the second [i.e. of repulsion resp. respect, D.S.] requires to 
keep each other at a proper distance” (TL 6:470.5—7, trans. and italics 
D.S.). This “analogy” (TL 6:449.7) is already used in §24. There too, 
Kant speaks of “attraction and repulsion (TL 6:449.8), and there too 
he means that we are “commanded ’ (TL 6:449.9, trans. and italics 
D.S.) by the “principle of mutual love [Wechselliebe]” (TL 
6:449.9),36 and that respect is something which we “owe” (TL 
6:449.10, italics D.S.) to each other; all of this cannot be true of feelings, 
but only of duties.37 Whereas duties of love and respect are only accessorily 
connected such that in a given case there is one duty that “constitutes the 
principle in the subject” (TL 6:448.21 £, trans. D.S.), in friendship this 
accessoric union of duties is replaced by a “most intimate union [inn igs- 
ten V ere in igung ]” (TL 6:469.14, italics D.S.). This is how Kant de­
scribes the union of the duty of love and the duty of respect in friendship. 
In friendship, this union is not accessoric, rather it is essential to friend­
34 Gregor translates “ästhetischen [Freundschaft, D.S.]” (TL 6:471.26) with “friend­
ship based on feeling;” this is probably what it means to say that a friendship is 
‘aesthetic’, still it is not what the text says.
35 Gregors translation is faulty: “For love [jene] can be regarded as attraction and 
respect [diese] as repulsion, and if  the principle of love [der ersteren] bids friends 
[there’s no talk o f ‘friends’ in German, D.S.] to draw closer, the principle o f re­
spect [der zweiten] requires them to stay [halten] at a proper distance from each 
other” (TL 6 :470 .4—7). Especially the replacement of “der ersteren” by “love” 
and “der zweiten” by “respect” is problematic; Kant might very well mean ‘Prin­
zip der Annäherung’ and ‘Prinzip der Abstoßung’ such that the principle of at­
traction is the principle o f love and the principle o f repulsion is the principle 
o f respect (though §23 suggests another reading). Here, this might only be a 
minor point; but again, one can see that translations are not trustworthy and po­
tentially misleading.
36 Cf. TL 6 :471.15  and 473.6.
37 Kant begins §24 like this: “In speaking o f laws o f duty [...]” (TL 6:449.4, italics 
D.S.).
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ship that love and respect are in an “Ebenmaß des Gleichgewicht.s” (TL 
6:470.3, italics D.S.), in “equal balance required for friendship” (TL 
6:470.3 £, italics D.S.). In §§26 -36  duties of love are treated ‘separate­
ly,’ and in §§37—44 the same is done with duties of respect; they are 
treated ‘separately although they “are really always united with each 
other according to the law in a single duty, yet only in such a way that 
now one duty, now the other constitutes the principle in the subject, 
such that one duty is joined to the other accessorily” (TL 6:448.19- 
22, trans. D.S.) (D2). When it comes to friendship, however, there is 
no separateness, and there is no accessoric connection; there is an ‘innigste 
Vereinigung.3S
3. A Sketch o f a Research Program
In what follows I will try to sketch a research program  for some of the 
other sections in the chapter on duties of love; this is a sketch only, be­
cause there are simply too many questions to be raised and too many ob­
servations to be made. By ‘research program’ I mean (in this specific con­
text) that there is a certain text highly in need of interpretation—up to 
the present day, there’s practically no detailed analysis of those sec­
tions—, and that one can make textual observations that call for a coherent 
interpretation whatever eventually the actual interpretation will be. Such 
a textual observation is (at least to some extent) interpretatively neutral, 
i. e. it does not necessarily imply a certain interpretation; still, it is an ob­
servation to be made, to be paid attention to and to be taken into ac­
count. For instance, pointing out that those occurrences of the demon­
strative pronoun “They” in §23 (TL 6:448.15, 448.19) are, at least at 
first sight, ambiguous, is a textual observation (along with further obser­
vations related to this). An interpretation of the whole section that ac­
counts for They! and They2 was offered too, and, of course, one may 
very well find this (my) interpretation false. The crucial point, however, 
is that one has to provide reasons why one finds it false and why an alter­
native interpretation is better, that is, the alternative interpretation must 
pay attention to and explicitly account fo r  the textual observations that have 
been made already. So anyone who writes an (interpretative) paper on 38
38 Burggraf, 2005, p. 159, thus gets it quite wrong when he claims that love and 
respect are “really always united with each other according to the law in a single 
duty” (TL 6:448.19  — 21, trans. D.S.) and then calls this very same union on the 
basis o f §46 ‘friendship’.
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§2339 must be aware of the literature written on this and must take into 
account, and account for, the textual observations that have been made in 
this literature; and then must offer a coherent interpretation that is true 
to the text, possibly accounting for even more textual details. If someone 
writes on §23 and does not refer to the problem of They1/They2 at all, or 
refers to it, but rejects the suggested interpretation without giving reasons, 
or refers to it, providing an alternative reading without accounting for the 
other textual observations related to the problem of They1/They2, then 
no progress in our Kant research has been made.40 ‘Research’ like this, 
and there are numerous examples for it, can go on forever and ever with­
out making any demonstrable progress in better understanding Kant.
So let me draw your attention to some crucial questions to which I 
can only, if at all, sketch an answer. All questions refer to the introductory 
remarks on the duties of love; needless to say, Kant’s discussion of these 
duties proper is no less difficult and no less in need of interpretation.
What Is the Maxim of the Duty of Love?
In §25, Kant mentions the “maxim of benevolence” (TL 6:449.20 f.), and 
this again shows up, with exacdy the same wording, in §27 (cf. TL 
6:450.31) and also, slightly changed, as the “maxim (of beneficence)” 
(again in §27) (TL 6:451.18; see also TL 6:451.7). But what exactly is 
the maxim when it comes to duties of love?41 There are three possibili­
ties: There could be (i) a general maxim of the duties of virtue toward 
others, (ii) a general maxim of all duties of love, and there could be 
(iii) specified maxims for each duty of love (a maxim of benevolence, a 
maxim of gratitude, and a maxim of sympathetic feeling). Let us have 
a brief look.
39 If someone does not want to interpret the text o f §23, one wonders why he or she 
refers to it.
40 Next to the central question o f the reference o f They1/They2, future research on 
§ 2 3 ,1 submit, should be in a position to account for the role o f the example and 
its relation to the preceding sentences (and thus for the “So” (TL 6:448.22)); for 
“{jede fur sich allein)” (TL 6:448.16, italics D.S.); for the sentence in parenthesis 
(“love o f one’s neighbor though [...]” (TL 6 :448 .16  f., trans. D.S.), noting the 
‘necessary’ quality o f love and respect); and to account for all the other details 
observed in (i)-(vii).
41 Here I cannot discuss the question o f what a maxim is; but it would have an ef­
fect on the interpretation.
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Ad (i) A general maxim o f  the duties o f  virtue toward others: In §§23 - 
25, which are about duties of love and  respect, Kant does not mention a 
general maxim of (all) these duties of virtue toward others; rather, Kant 
distinguishes between a maxim of duties of love and a maxim of duties of 
respect. In the Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre, this is different. There it says; 
“Das allgemeine Princip der Tugendpflicht gegen andere Menschen ist: 
trage gegen jedermann Liebe und Achtung” (VATL 23:407.19 £). 
(“The general principle of the duty of virtue toward other human beings 
is: have [trage] love and respect toward everyone” (VATL 23:407.19 f-, 
trans. D.S.).)
Not much is said herewith; for what does it mean to “have love and 
respect toward everyone”? Incidentally, in those Vorarbeiten (as in §25), 
Kant also puts much emphasis on his claim that love and respect in 
this context are not treated as feelings, but as duties.
Ad (ii) A general maxim o f  all duties o f  love: It is somewhat confusing 
or misleading that in §§25 and 27 Kant speaks of a ‘maxim of benevo­
lence (or beneficence); after all, benevolence is only one of the three du­
ties of love, and up to §27, the text is about duties of love in general (up 
to §25 it is even about respect). As a matter of fact, Kant speaks repeat­
edly about duties of love as if these duties consisted only in duties of be­
nevolence. Thus, in §26 (a section still about duties of love in general) he 
says that ‘practical philanthropy’—which earlier he had called “love of 
one’s neighbor” (TL 6:448.16 f., trans. D.S.)42 and “duty of love for 
one’s neighbor” (TL 6:450.3)—“must be taken as active benevolence” 
(TL 6:450.16—18), almost as if Menschenliebe as a duty is nothing but 
such (active) benevolence.43 Yet, something like a general maxim of all 
duties of love can be found in §25:
First, the German original:
Die Pflicht der Nächstenliebe kann also auch so ausgedrückt werden: sie ist 
die Pflicht, Anderer ihre Z w eck e  (sofern diese nur nicht unsittlich sind) zu 
den meinen zu machen; die Pflicht der Achtung meines Nächsten ist in der 
Maxime enthalten, keinen anderen Menschen bloß als M ittel zu meinen
42 On my interpretation, ‘love o f one’s neighbor’ in TL 6 :448.16  (i.e. in §23) is 
about practical love, not about the feeling; here too it shows how important a 
close reading o f §23 is for other contexts as well.
43 It is therefore remarkable that Kant in one place o f the Vomrbeiten zur Tugend- 
lehre (VATL 23:410) discusses duties o f love in general, but notes in parentheses 
after “Liebespflichten” (VATL 23:410.28): “(eigendich die des Wohlwollens) [ 
(actually the [duty, D.S.] o f benevolence)]” (VATL 23:410.28).
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Zwecken abzuwiirdigen (nicht zu verlangen, der Andere solle sich selbst weg- 
werfen, um meinem Zwecke zu frohnen) (TL 6 :4 5 0 .3 -8 ) .
Here’s my translation:
Thus the duty o f love for one’s neighbor can also be expressed like this: It is 
the duty to make the others ends my own (provided only that these are not 
immoral); the duty o f respect for my neighbor is contained in the maxim not 
to devalue any other human being to a mere means to my ends (not to de­
mand that the other cast away himself in order to indulge my end) (TL 
6 :4 5 0 .3 - 8 ,  trans. D.S.).
The “maxim” (TL 6:450.6) of the “duty of respect for my neighbor” (TL 
6:450.5, trans. D.S.) shall be of no interest to us here.44 However, note 
that Kant does speak of a ‘maxim here, and that he does so in a way 
that emphasizes the parallel of the maxim of duties of respect with the 
maxim of duties of love although the first part of the sentence does 
not make use of the term ‘maxim’ with regard to duties of love; clearly, 
however, Kant has a maxim of the duties of love in mind. Based on the 
first part of that sentence (“Thus the duty of love for one’s neighbor can 
also be expressed like this: It is the duty to make the other’s ends my own 
(provided only that these are not immoral)” (TL 6 :450.3-5 , trans. 
D.S.)), this maxim can be expressed as follows: Make other’s ends your 
ownZ45 Further passages confirm this: Thus, beneficence as practical be­
nevolence, i.a. a benevolence based on a maxim, is defined as “making the 
other’s well-being and good one’s end [sich das Wo hi und Heil des An- 
deren zum Zweck zu machen, (das Wohlthun)]” (TL 6:452.4 f., trans.
44 See also TL 6 :488 .14— 19: “All moral relations o f rational beings, which involve 
a principle o f the harmony o f the will o f one with that o f another, can be reduced 
to love and respect-, and, insofar as this principle is practical, in the case o f love the 
basis for determining one’s will can be reduced to another’s end, and in the case of 
respect, to another’s right.” — On duties o f respect, see Sensens contribution to 
this volume.
45 Accordingly, the maxim o f respect would be: Do not degrade any other human 
being to a m ere means to yo u r ends! (The proviso regarding the morality o f the 
ends goes without saying.) -  Note that Kant says that the duty o f love of one’s 
neighbor (Nächstenliebe) can “also” (TL 6:450.3, italics D.S.) be expressed as 
‘making the other’s ends my own.’ But why ‘also’? Maybe because the maxim 
to make the other’s ends my own is an explication o f ‘benevolence;’ but 
maybe this formulation (to make the other’s ends my own) is a replacement of 
the Biblical command (and formulation) that is usually connected with the con­
cept o f ‘Nächstenliebe’ sc., ‘love your neighbor as yourself’ which, however, is 
only manifest in §§27—28. — Many thanks to Christian Hamm for a very fruitful 
discussion on this.
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and italics D.S.); again, for Kant beneficence often stands for duties of 
love in general. Further, in section XVIII of the “Introduction” it says 
that duties of love for ones neigbor are duties to perform actions “by 
which one makes [...] others an end” (TL 6:410.19 f.)46. Finally, this in­
terpretation is confirmed by Vorarbeiten zur Tugendlehre. For there the 
maxim of the duties of love is expressed as follows: “den Zweck Anderer 
auch zu dem Meinen zu machen” (“to make others ends also my own”) 
(VATL 23:407.28, trans. D.S.). Duties of love, says Kant in those Vorar­
beiten, “gehen auf die Zusammenstimmung des Zwecks der Menschen zu 
den Zwecken aller Anderen” (roughly: “are directed toward the harmony 
between the ends of all human beings”) (VATL 23:406.29-407.1, trans. 
D.S.).47
Ad (Hi) Specified maxims fo r  each duty o f  love:
(a) The maxim o f  benevolence: As already mentioned, in § 28 Kant speaks 
of a ‘maxim of benevolence.’ In the following sections, there are fur­
ther formulations that narrow the circle of the adressees of one’s be­
neficence.48 Beneficence, says Kant in §29, is practical benevolence 
“with regard to those in need  [in Ansehung der Bedürftigen\’, (TL 
6:452.25, italics D.S.).49 Formulated as a duty50 (§30), Kant says: 
“To be beneficent, that is, to promote according to one’s means 
the happiness of others [anderen Menschen] in need [in Nöthen], 
without hoping for something in return, is everyone’s [jedes Men­
schen] duty” (TL 6 :453 .2-4); in his comments on this, Kant uses 
“Noth” three times (TL 6:453.5, 453.7, 453.9), but replaces this 
term by the one (and somewhat weaker) term used in §30, to wit, 
“Bedürftige” (TL 6:453.13) resp. “bedürftige” (TL 6:453.14).51 Fi­
46 Gregor’s translation might be misleading: “[...] by which one makes [...] others 
ones end” (italics D.S.); but “one’s” has no equivalent in German. It just says: 
“[...] durch die der Mensch [...] andere zum  Zweck macht” (italics D.S.) (it 
does not say: ‘zu seinem  Zweck macht’).
47 Cf. VATL 23 :411.6  f :  “Liebe ist Zusammenstimmung mit dem Zweck Ander­
er.”
48 With regard to gratitude, Kant calls this “E x ten sio n ” (TL 6:455.26) of a duty 
(Gregor translates “ex ten f).
49 The whole passage is only loosely translated by Gregor; I will not get into details.
50 In §29 it says that we have the duty “to adopt this maxim [of beneficence, D.S.] 
as a universal law” (TL 6:452.29 fi).
51 Gregor translates both terms (Not, Bedürftige) and their variants with ‘need.’ 
That’s noteworthy, because one can be ‘bedürftig without being ‘in Not;’ after 
all, it is a crucial question how much latitude one has in carrying out the duty 
of beneficence.
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nally, note one more difficult formulation in §29: “Wohlwollen ist 
das Vergnügen an der Glückseligkeit (dem Wohlsein) Anderer; 
Wohlthun aber die Maxime, sich dasselbe zum Zweck zu machen” 
(in Gregors translation: “Benevolence is satisfaction in the happiness 
(well-being) of others; but beneficence is the maxim of making oth­
ers’ happiness one’s end”) (TL 6:452.26-28, italics D.S.). What does 
“dasselbe” (TL 6:452.28) refer to? For grammatical reasons, it can­
not refer to “Glückseligkeit [happiness]” (TL 6:452.27), since “das­
selbe” (TL 6:452.28) requires a neuter, “Glückseligkeit” (TL 
6:452.27), however, is feminine.52 As for the gender, one could 
refer it to “dem Wohlsein” (TL 6:452.27) (in parentheses, the 
“well-being [Wohlsein]” (TL 6:452.27) is neuter), with the result 
that the maxim is to make the well-being of others one’s end, 
which makes sense, of course. Strictly speaking, however, “dasselbe” 
(TL 6:452.28) can only refer to “Vergnügen” (TL 6:452.27) (satis­
faction or fun), and then the proposition is to make that “ Vergnügen 
(TL 6:452.27, italics D.S.) one’s end. Given that “Vergnügen an der 
Glückseligkeit (dem Wohlsein) Anderer” (“satisfaction in the happi­
ness (well-being) of others”) (TL 6:452.27) is the definition of 
“[b] enevolence” (TL 6:452.26), Kant’s claim would be that benefi­
cence is the maxim to make benevolence one’s end; and that does 
not sound so absurd, does it?53
52 Gregor replaces “dasselbe” (TL 6:452.28) with “happiness.” — Note another 
problem with §29 as well: Kant begins this section (§29) with a paragraph on 
the “Pflicht des Menschen gegen  sich selbst [duty of man to himself]” (TL 
6:452.22, trans. and italics D.S.). That is strange because Kant is about to 
write on the duty o f beneficence as a duty to others. Even more remarkable is 
that the first sentence o f the next paragraph (in the English translation) begins 
as follows: “But beyond benevolence in our wishes [...]” (TL 6:452.23, italics 
D.S., emphasis in the original erased), and then in this paragraph there is abso­
lutely no reference to what is said in the first paragraph o f §29; this “[b]ut” can­
not be explained. Suppose we consider a conjecture: The first paragraph o f §29 
as it is edited (TL 6 :452 .16—22) does not belong to that §29 at all; rather, the 
second paragraph o f §29 (as it is now: TL 6:452.23 — 30) should be the first 
paragraph of §29. This would make for a very fitting connection with the last 
paragraph in the proceeding §28 where Kant does talk about “benevolence in 
wishes' (TL 6:452.1). The question, o f course, then is where TL 6 :452 .16—22 
belongs— maybe to §27 where Kant discusses the duty o f benevolence to oneself 
(which is the topic o f TL 6 :452 .16—22)? I cannot get into further details here; 
note, however, that editorial problems o f the Metaphysik d er Sitten are common. 
For a recent example, see Bacin/Schönecker, 2010.
53 This “Vergnügen” is mentioned again in §31 (TL 6:453.20).
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(b) The maxim o f  gratitude: There is no direct or indirect formulation of 
a ‘maxim’ of gratitude. It all depends on what ‘gratitude’ is, and that 
is not a question easy to answer because it involves, generally speak­
ing, both a feeling (honoring) and an act of service.
(c) The maxim o f  sympathy: The same is (possibly) true for “[t]h e il-  
nehm ende E m pfindung” (TL 6:456.18): There seems to be 
no direct or indirect formulation of a ‘maxim’ of this sympathy; 
but it is not entirely clear because the relevant sections (§§32 — 33) 
are very hard to understand.
Is There a Duty to Be Benevolent To Oneself? (§27)
Kant often puts his ethical maxims or precepts in the context of Christian 
ethics.54 In §§27-28  too he relates the duty and maxim of benevolence 
to the “formula [Formel]55: Love your neighbor [N ächsten]56 (your fel­
low human being) as yourself” (TL 6:451.28 f., trans. D.S.).57 I have al­
ready noted that §27 is about the question of whether, and how, benev­
olence can be directed towards oneself (given that the Christian precept 
commands love of one’s neighbor as oneself-, §28 discussses the problem 
that benevolence (or philanthropy), despite the universality of the re­
quired love of one’s neighbors, must allow for degrees. These sections, 
in particular §28, are very hard to understand. Let me pose some ques­
tions, first on §27.
(1) §27 begins as follows: “In accordance with the ethical law of per­
fection ‘love your neighbor as yourself,’ the maxim of benevolence (prac­
tical love of human beings) is a duty of all human beings toward one an­
other, whether or not one finds them worthy of love” (TL 6:450.31—34). 
Is it really beyond doubt (as Gregor’s translation suggests) that the “eth­
ical law of perfection” (TL 6:450.33), rather than the “maxim of benev­
olence” (TL 6:450.31), is to be identified with that Christian precept (to 
love your neighbor as yourself) ? Maybe the “maxim of benevolence” (TL
54 An important passage is KpV 5:81 IF.
55 Gregor translates “Formel” (TL 6:451.28) as “precept.”
56 The literal meaning of ‘Nächster is: someone who is near (close) to you.
57 The opposite maxim, as it were, is this: “everyone for himself, God for us all” 
(TL 6:452.3), and: “Everyone for himself, God (fortune) for us all” (TL 
6:452.32 f.).
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6:450.31) (at the beginning of the first sentence)58 is to be identified with 
that precept; after all, in §25 the duty of love is called the “duty of love 
for ones neighbor” (TL 6:450.3). And then the claim would be this: 
‘The maxim of benevolence is a duty of all human beings towards one 
another, whether or not one finds them worthy of love, according to 
the ethical law of perfection (which is not formulated), and the maxim 
is this: Love your neighbor as yourself.’ In what follows, Kant does 
speak about love of one’s neighbor and then again twice about a 
maxim, so that would fit.
(2) The main argument of §27, I believe, is as follows:
1. The maxim of benevolence is a universal duty for all human beings 
regarding all human beings.
2. I am a human being.
Therefore, the maxim of benevolence is a duty for me regarding myself as 
well.
The main problem is this: Since everyone loves himself or herself 
anyway, there can be, so it seems, no duty to love oneself. How is this rec­
oncilable with that argument? Despite the fact that “the law making be­
nevolence a duty will include myself, as an object of benevolence” (TL 
6:451.8 f.), Kant says very clearly that there can be “no obligation” 
(TL 6:451.12) to love oneself. Rather, he says, the maxim “permits you 
to be benevolent to yourself” (TL 6:451.16 f.). But how is this a solution 
to the problem? Of course, everything that is obligatory is permitted; not 
everything that is permitted, however, is obligatory. But the maxim does 
not say that it is permissible to love all human beings (including oneself); 
it says that one ought to love all human beings (including oneself). Add­
ing the condition that one may only be benevolent to oneself provided 
one is “benevolent to every other as well” (TL 6:451.17) does not, it 
seems to me, change that; still the question remains whether benevolence 
to oneself is permissible or obligatory.
58 Gregor restructures the sentence. In German, it says: “Die Maxime des Wohlwol­
lens (die praktische Menschenliebe) ist aller Menschen Pflicht gegen einander, 
man mag diese nun liebenswürdig finden oder nicht, nach dem ethischen Gesetz 
der Vollkommenheit: Liebe deinen Nebenmenschen als dich selbst” (TL 
6 :4 50 .3 1-3 4 ) . I cannot pursue this but note that there is an important differ­
ence in the punctuation between the Meiner Edition and the Academy Edition; 
the Meiner Edition, but not the Academy Edition, supports the Gregor-reading.
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May There Be Different Degrees of Benevolence? (§28)
This section is one of the most difficult sections of the entire book, I 
would maintain. Again, I can only sketch some observations and ques­
tions.
1) What is the main topic? Setting aside (for the time being) the first 
paragraph and looking only at the second (and final) paragraph, there 
seems to be a clear structure. Kant formulates a problem up to the hy­
phen (cf. TL 6:451.35); after the hyphen, the problem is solved. What 
is the problem? At first sight, things seem to be fairly easy; its about 
the ‘fitting’ of the evangelical command59 with certain facts about me 
and my neighbors: “Yet one human being is closer [näher] to me than 
the other, and in benevolence I am to myself the closest [der Nächste]. 
How does this fit with the formula: Love your neighbor [deinen N ächs­
ten] (your fellow human being)60 as yourself?” (TL 6:451.27—29, trans. 
D.S.)61 So Kant sees a contradiction: “I cannot, without contradicting 
myself, say that I ought to love every human being as myself” (TL 
6 :451.33 £). Why not? The evangelical command says “that I ought to 
love every human being as myself” (TL 6:451.34), i. e. love everyone 
with that degree x of love with which I love myself. This, however, ap­
pears not to be compatible with Kant’s assumption that different degrees 
of obligatory benevolence are permissible. For if it is permissible to show 
different degrees of benevolence to different people, how then shall I show 
the same degree x of benevolence to all people (‘love everyone with that 
degree x of love’) ?
2) In the second paragraph, Kant uses several variants of ‘Nähe’ 
(closeness) six times.62 One would think that what he means by this 
‘Nähe’ is something like, say, personal closeness on grounds of social, spi­
ritual, family relations or whatever. This is certainly true for some of these 
occurrences of ‘Nähe,’ but not true for at least two of them. For in (at
59 This is how Kant calls it, for instance, in the second Critique (cf. KpV 5:81 f.).
60 In German, it says “Afitmenschen” (TL 6 :451.29, italics D.S.); in the earlier for­
mulation o f the evangelical command in §27, Kant says “/ViAwnenschen” (TL 
6:450.34, italics D.S.); Gregor translates the latter with “neighbor,” the former 
with “fellow-human being.”
61 Kants construes the problem around the German words ‘näher,’ ‘d er Nächste,’ 
‘deinen Nächsten;’ this is an important connotation that gets lost i f  one only 
reads the translation: ‘Love your neighbor’ should literally be translated as 
‘love the one that is next to you,’ or: ‘that is close to you.’
62 Cf. TL 6 :451.27, 451.28, 451.29, 451.30, 451.32, 452.7.
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least) two cases, this closeness is not understood descriptively (I am close 
to someone), but prescriptively (I ought to be close to someone). Kant 
writes: “If one is closer to me than another {in the duty o f  benevolence), 
[and, D.S.]63 I am thus [also]64 obliged  to greater benevolence to one 
than to the other but am admittedly closer to myself {even in terms o f  
duty [selbst der P flicht nach])65 than to any other [ . . . ]” (TL 6:451.29 — 
33, trans. and italics D.S.). So one can be closer’ to some person than 
to another ‘in the duty of benevolence,’ i. e. one can be obliged to 
more or to less benevolence (‘greater benevolence’ or less) depending 
on the person to whom my benevolence will be directed. Of course, 
here the second meaning of ‘closeness’ kicks in: Whether I am under ob­
ligation to more or to less benevolence, will (among other things, none of 
them mentioned in §28) depend on my personal closeness. This meaning 
o f ‘closeness’ (i. e. personal closeness), I believe, is what Kant has in mind 
when at the end of the paragraph he says that “in acting the degree [of 
obligation, D.S.] can vary quite greatly, according to the variety among 
those who are loved [Verschiedenheit der Geliebten] (one of whom con­
cerns me more closely than the other [deren Einer mich näher angeht als 
der Andere])” (TL 6:452.6-9 , trans. and italics D.S.).66
3) Wh at is Kant’s solution to that alleged ‘contradiction? In the last 
sentence just discussed, the problem is described as running the risk of 
“violating the universality of the maxim” (TL 6:452.8) by allowing differ­
ent degrees of benevolence to which one is obligated. But that, it seems to 
me, is not the problem introduced before the hyphen. Rather, the prob­
lem is that “the measure of self-love would allow for no difference in de­
gree” (TL 6:451.34 £). Kant does not discuss, let alone justify, the claim 
that due to personal closeness different degrees of closeness ‘in the duty of 
benevolence’ are real and permissible. His claim is, I believe, true yet far 
from self-evident. Moreover, he has no solution to the real problem: If I 
am to love everyone as I love myself, then I am to love everyone with the
63 There’s no ‘u n d  in German (as Gregor’s translation suggests); though it’s hard in 
English to omit it.
64 Gregor translates ‘also with ‘therefore;’ but that’s misleading, because the ‘also is 
only explicative (in terms o f ‘that is . . . ’).
65 Gregor translates: “even in accordance with duty”.
66 Again, Gregor’s translation is much looser: “[...] in acting I can [...] vary the 
degree greatly in accordance with the different objects of my love (one of 
whom concerns me more closely than another).” The “Geliebten” (TL 
6:452.7), however, are not ‘objects’ o f my love, but persons; in German, ‘Gelieb­
te’ is never a word used for objects but for persons.
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one, and only one, degree of love I love myself; but then there can be no 
differences in degree when it comes to my love toward others.
4) In the first paragraph of §28, Kant talks about “the benevolence in 
the general love for human beings [allgemeine [] Menschenliebe] ” (TL 
6:451.21, trans. D.S.).67 It is far from clear, though, what this ‘allgemeine 
Menschenliebe is. Menschenliebe’ is certainly equivalent to, or even iden­
tical with, benevolence. However, since benevolence has both an aesthetic 
and a practical meaning, that1allgemeine Menschenliebe’ could be two dif­
ferent things.
In one interpretation, it would be a “fee lin g  (TL 6:449.17), or 
maybe “benevolence in wishes” (TL 6:452.1), or an inclination, possibly 
based on the definition of philanthropy in §28 where a friend of human­
ity is understood as someone who finds pleasure in the well-being of 
human beings as such. In any event, ‘allgemeiri (general, universal) is 
this ‘Menschenliebe inasmuch as every human being is loved by those 
who possess ''Menschenliebe.
Another interpretation takes 1allgemeine Menschenliebe’ to be that be­
nevolence that to have and to actively perform (beneficence) is a wide 
duty (of love). This interpretation is supported by the following consid­
eration: The second paragraph in §28 is connected with the first by a 
“Yet [Aber]” (TL 6:451.27).68 Later in that paragraph, Kant explicitly 
distinguishes “benevolence in wishes” (TL 6:452.1) from “active, practical 
benevolence” (TL 6:452.4), which consists in “making the well-being and 
happiness of others my en d ’ (TL 6:452.4 £), and the latter is certainly 
benevolence as a duty. If one reads the proviso “what is meant here” 
(TL 6:452.1, italics D.S.) back to what is said before the hyphen, this 
suggests that ‘allgemeine Menschenliebe’ is that practical benevolence. If 
so, the idea expressed in the first paragraph of §28 is just the same as
67 Gregor translates: “the benevolence present in love for all human beings” (TL 
6:451.21). There’s no equivalent for ‘present’ in the German text. The most im­
portant (and difficult) term in that formulation, to wit, “allgemeinen [general]” 
(TL 6 :451.21) is rendered with “¿r//human beings” (italics D.S.), but that is al­
ready an interpretation. A  bit later, Kant speaks again about “allgemeinen Men­
schenliebe” (TL 6:451.23 £), and that too is translated with “love for all human 
beings.” In §35, however, Kant also speaks o f an “allgemeinen Nächstenliebe” 
(TL 6:458.13  f.) which Gregor does not translate with ‘love for all one’s neigh­
bors’ (or so), but (correctly) with “universallove. for one’s neighbor” (italics D.S.). 
Incidentally, in that translation ‘present’ has no equivalence in the German text.
68 Also, the first sentence o f §28 picks up what was said before (with the “now” (TL 
6:451.21)), and in the predeceding section practical benevolence was discussed.
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what Kant already pointed out in §27: Benevolence is “a duty of all 
human beings toward one another” (TL 6:450.31 £, italics D.S.); every­
one is obligated, and everyone is the object of ones obligation. This being 
said, the question now is ... (and then Kant continues with his analysis of 
closeness and different degrees). Thus, the generality of the love for 
human beings (‘allgemeine Menschenliebe’) would be taken up again in 
the “universality of the maxim [Allgemeinheit der Maxime]” (TL 
6:452.8).®
But the other interpretation, according to which ‘allgemeine Men­
schenliebe’ is not understood as a duty, has something to be said for it 
as well: It says that “I take an interest in this human beings well­
being” (TL 6:451.23, italics D.S.), rather than ‘I ought to take’ such an 
interest; and that “I am only not indifferent with regard to him” (TL 
6:451.25 f., italics D.S.), rather than ‘I ought only not to be indifferent 
with regard to him.’ Also, if practical benevolence is what Kant has in 
mind in the first paragraph of §28, then this practical benevolence 
would be “the smallest in its degree” (TL 6:451.22). But would this 
make sense? Practical benevolence, i.e. the required action (beneficence) 
as a wide duty has no degree whatsoever before its specified (unless all 
Kant wants to say is that there is a general and prima fa cie  duty to be be­
nevolent).69 70
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